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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The Chinese government decided in 2007 to join a growing list of nations and create a sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF). The resulting entity—the China Investment Corporation (CIC)—with an initial capital 
fund of $200 billion, was a significant new addition to the existing pool of SWFs. The rapid expansion of 
SWFs in 2007, and in particular, the CIC’s creation, became the subject of significant congressional inquiry 
in 2007 and 2008. Several congressional committees – including the Joint Economic Committee, the 
Senate Banking Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Financial Services 
Committee, and the House Foreign Relations Committee – held hearings on the growth of SWFs and their 
implications for the U.S. economy and national security. In February 2008, the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, a congressional advisory panel, convened a day-long hearing on SWFs, with 
a focus on the CIC. 
After the onset of the global financial crisis, concerns about SWFs in general and the CIC in particular 
diminished, in part because the CIC and many of the other major SWFs sharply curtailed their investment 
activities. However, starting in 2009, the CIC began making major investments in several different 
companies, with an apparent focus on energy and natural resources companies. In addition, one of the 
CIC’s subsidiaries, the Central Huijin Investment Corporation (Central Huijin), made substantial 
investments in several larger Chinese banks andfinancial enterprises, which in turn, began to back 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investments by state-owned enterprises and private 
corporations. 
Its renewed investment activities have rekindled congressional and scholarly concerns about the nature 
and intent of the CIC’s overall investment strategy. Although the CIC maintains that it is an institutional 
investor seeking to maximize its rate of return, some observers speculate that the CIC is operating as a 
vehicle for a Chinese government strategy to secure access and possibly control over resources 
necessary for China’s growing economy. Some are concerned that China’s expanding international 
holdings of energy and strategic resources may pose a risk to U.S. security. Discussions of ways to 
monitor and regulate the investment activities of SWFs and the CIC have reappeared among international 
experts and in Congress. 
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China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: Developments and Policy Implications 
Summary 
China’s ruling executive body, the State Council, established the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC), a sovereign wealth fund, in September 2007 to invest $200 billion of China’s then $1.4 
trillion in foreign exchange reserves. As with other sovereign wealth funds worldwide, the CIC’s 
existence allows China to invest its reserves in a wide range of assets, including stocks, bonds, 
and hedge funds. After a rocky start in which it incurred losses of 2.1% on its global investments 
in 2008 – caused in part by aftereffects of the global financial crisis of 2007 – the CIC’s rate of 
return in 2009 rose to 11.7%. The State Council is reportedly considering a CIC request for an 
additional $200 billion out of China’s $2.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. 
Congress and financial analysts raised concerns about the CIC after its creation, partly because it 
was a comparatively large sovereign wealth fund, partly because it was government-owned, and 
partly because it reported directly to the State Council. Some observers were apprehensive that 
the Chinese government would use the CIC to acquire control over strategically important natural 
resources, obtain access to sensitive technology, and/or disrupt international financial markets. 
The CIC attempted to counter these concerns by announcing that its investment strategy would 
conform to international standards, and sought only to maximize its “risk-adjusted financial 
return.” The CIC also promised to avoid politically and strategically sensitive investments. 
The CIC has been the focus of discussions among China’s leadership about its economic 
objectives and its organizational structure. Soon after its creation, the CIC became the sole owner 
of Central Huijin Investment Limited (Central Huijin), an investment fund established by China’s 
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), as a vehicle for injecting capital into major 
Chinese banks. Over the last three years, Central Huijin has provided billions of dollars to the 
Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), and other financial institutions. Some analysts maintain that there is an inherent 
conflict between the CIC’s goal to maximize its return on investments and Central Huijin’s 
mission to provide capital to domestic financial institutions, and advocate their separation. While 
there have been reports of a possible separation, Central Huijin remains a subsidiary of the CIC. 
Concerns about the CIC’s investment activities reemerged in 2009 when it greatly expanded its 
overseas holdings, and began acquiring stakes in energy companies, natural resource companies 
and alternative energy companies. According to its filings with the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the CIC had holdings in 82 U.S. entities as of December 31, 2009. 
Commentators once again questioned the true goals of the CIC’s investment strategy. The CIC 
maintains that its main mission is to maximize its long-term, risk-adjusted rate of return. 
For Congress, the investment activities of the CIC and its subsidiary, Central Huijin, raise 
questions about U.S. policies on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the global 
competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions. Some question if the current controls on inward 
FDI via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, SEC, and other agencies 
provide adequate protection of U.S. strategic assets and technology from investments by the CIC 
and other Chinese entities. Others are concerned that Central Huijin’s assistance to Chinese banks 
and financial institutions are part of a larger strategy to increase China’s influence in strategic 
markets. These commentators suggest that more should be done to protect the United States from 
China’s rising role in international capital markets. 
This report will not be updated. 
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Introduction 
The Chinese government decided in 2007 to join a growing list of nations and create a sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF).1 The resulting entity—the China Investment Corporation (CIC)—with an 
initial capital fund of $200 billion, was a significant new addition to the existing pool of SWFs 
(see Table 1). The rapid expansion of SWFs in 2007, and in particular, the CIC’s creation, 
became the subject of significant congressional inquiry in 2007 and 2008.2 Several congressional 
committees – including the Joint Economic Committee, the Senate Banking Committee, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Financial Services Committee, and the House 
Foreign Relations Committee – held hearings on the growth of SWFs and their implications for 
the U.S. economy and national security. In February 2008, the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, a congressional advisory panel, convened a day-long hearing on SWFs, 
with a focus on the CIC.3 
Table 1. Leading Sovereign Wealth Funds (as of April 2008) 
Size 
Country Fund ($ Billion) Year Created 
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 
Norway 
Singapore 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
China 
Hong Kong 
Russia 
Singapore 
Government Pension Fund - Global 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
China Investment Corporation, Ltd. (CIC) 
Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio 
Reserve Fund 
Temasek Holdings 
500 - 875 
375 
200 - 330 
270 
213 
200 
139 
128 
110 
1976 
1990 
1981 
1952 
1953 
2007 
1993 
2008 
1974 
Source: CRS summary of table in Edwin Truman, “A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices,” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, No. PB08-3, April 2008. 
After the onset of the global financial crisis, concerns about SWFs in general and the CIC in 
particular diminished, in part because the CIC and many of the other major SWFs sharply 
curtailed their investment activities. However, starting in 2009, the CIC began making major 
investments in several different companies, with an apparent focus on energy and natural 
resources companies. In addition, one of the CIC’s subsidiaries, the Central Huijin Investment 
Corporation (Central Huijin), made substantial investments in several larger Chinese banks and 
1
 According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, a sovereign wealth fund is a “government investment vehicle 
which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets separately from the official reserves of the 
monetary authorities.” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Semiannual Report on International Economic and Exchange 
Rate Policies, June 2007.) 
2
 For more about congressional interest in SWFs, see CRS Report RL34336, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and 
Policy Issues for Congress, by Martin A. Weiss. 
3
 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investments for National Security, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 7, 2008. 
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financial enterprises, which in turn, began to back outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
domestic investments by state-owned enterprises and private corporations. 
Its renewed investment activities have rekindled congressional and scholarly concerns about the 
nature and intent of the CIC’s overall investment strategy. Although the CIC maintains that it is 
an institutional investor seeking to maximize its rate of return, some observers speculate that the 
CIC is operating as a vehicle for a Chinese government strategy to secure access and possibly 
control over resources necessary for China’s growing economy. Some are concerned that China’s 
expanding international holdings of energy and strategic resources may pose a risk to U.S. 
security. Discussions of ways to monitor and regulate the investment activities of SWFs and the 
CIC have reappeared among international experts and in Congress. 
Background 
China announced in March 2007 that it would create a sovereign wealth fund to invest its 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves more profitably than the usual low-risk/low-return items, 
such as U.S. Treasury Notes. After a few delays, China’s new sovereign wealth fund officially 
started operations on September 29, 2007. The CIC provided China with another avenue by 
which it could invest its growing foreign exchange reserves, which totaled $1.4 trillion as of 
September 2007, and which have continued to grow, standing at $2.45 trillion as of July 2010.4 
The genesis of the CIC was apparently subject to political infighting among China’s major 
financial institutions, with both China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and 
the Ministry of Finance vying for control over the new SWF. In the end, the CIC was placed 
directly under the control of the State Council, China’s ruling executive body. The investment 
activities of the CIC are nominally directed by an 11-member board of directors. However, a 
separate seven-person Executive Committee is generally considered to be in charge of the CIC’s 
day-to-day operation. 
According to the CIC’s webpage, its mission “is to make long-term investments that maximize 
risk adjusted financial returns for the benefit of its shareholder [the State Council].”5 From its 
inception, the CIC has stressed that its investment decisions are made purely on a commercial 
basis. However, some of its investments raise questions about their commercial merit.6 
In particular, the CIC assumed responsibility for the assets and liabilities of the Central Huijin 
Investment Limited (Central Huijin) in November 2007. As a result, the CIC indirectly became a 
major stock holder in the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), and other Chinese financial institutions.7 Central Huijin’s main mission is to 
“make equity investments in major state-owned financial enterprises … to achieve the goal of 
4
 According to China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), its foreign exchange reserves as of the end 
of September 2007 totaled $1.434 trillion. Monthly data are provided on SAFE’s webpage, http://www.safe.gov.cn. 
5
 See http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/about_cic/aboutcic_overview.html. 
6
 For more about the initial concerns about CIC’s investment goals, see CRS Report RL34337, China’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, by Michael F. Martin. 
7
 According to CCB’s webpage http://www.ccb.com, the CHIC owns 70.69% of CCB’s shares, including 9.21% owned 
by its subsidiary, Central Jianyin Investment Company. According to the ICBC’s webpage http://www.icbc.com.cn, the 
CHIC owns 35.33% of ICBC’s shares. 
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preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned financial assets.”8 Some observers see a 
contradiction between the missions of the CIC and Central Huijin. 
Overview of the CIC 
The China Investment Corporation is a wholly state-owned company, under the direct supervision 
of the State Council, China’s ruling executive body. The daily operations of the CIC are managed 
by its Executive Committee, which is overseen by a board of directors (appointed by the State 
Council) and monitored by a board of supervisors (also appointed by the State Council). the 
CIC’s chief executive officer is Lou Jiwei, its chief operating officer is Zhang Hongli, and its 
chief risk officer is Jesse Wang Jianxi.9 
The details of the CIC’s investment operations are not readily available and the company’s annual 
reports do not include detailed listings of its holdings. The CIC utilizes both its internal staff of 
about 250 people, as well as contracted asset management companies and an unknown number of 
subsidiary investment companies, to make investments. Since its creation, there have been several 
unconfirmed reports that the CIC has hired specific asset management companies (including U.S. 
firms) to manage a portion of its investment portfolio, but the CIC and the alleged companies 
have generally refused to comment on the details. The CIC’s 2009 annual report indicates that 
51% of its holdings are externally managed and 41% are internally managed.10 Among the CIC’s 
known subsidiaries are Beijing Wonderful Investment, Ltd., Chengdong Investment Corporation, 
Country Forest Limited, Fullbloom Investment Corporation, Land Breeze II, Stable Investment 
Corporation, and Central Huijin. While the CIC technically owns Central Huijin, Central Huijin 
has its own board of directors, board of supervisors, and executive officers. The CIC’s CEO Lou 
Jiwei is the chairman of Central Huijin’s board of directors, and the CIC executive vice president 
Peng Chun is Central Huijin’s chairman. 
According to its 2009 annual report, the CIC’s investment objective is “to achieve an appropriate 
long-term and risk-adjusted return for its shareholder [the State Council].”11 In its efforts to 
achieve this goal, the CIC says it abides by four key investment principles. First, it selects 
investments based on commercial criteria. Second, it is a passive, financial investor, and does not 
seek control of companies. Third, the CIC complies with the laws and regulations of the countries 
in which it makes investments. Fourth, investments are selected based on research utilizing 
standard evaluation techniques. In addition, the CIC is a founding member of the International 
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) and has agreed to abide by the IFSWF’s Santiago 
Principles, which set voluntary guidelines of behavior for SWFs.12 
8
 See Central Huijin’s webpage, http://www.huijin-inv.cn/hjen/aboutus/aboutus_2008.html?var1=About. 
9
 For this report, Chinese names are listed in their traditional order, with surnames first, followed given names. In cases 
where a person has adopted a Western given name, the adopted name is listed first, followed by the surname, and then 
the Chinese given names. 
10
 China Investment Corporation, Annual Report 2009, Beijing, China, July 2010, page 34. 
11
 China Investment Corporation, Annual Report 2009, Beijing, China, July 2010, page 28. 
12
 The Santiago Principles consist of 23 principles concerning the operation and management of sovereign wealth 
funds, adopted in October 2008 in Santiago, Chile. For the complete text of the principles, see http://www.iwg-swf.org/ 
pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf. 
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Since its creation in September 2007, the CIC has grown from its initial capital endowment of 
$200 billion to a total worth of $332 billion at the end of 2009. In 2009, the CIC’s return on its 
total registered capital was 12.9% and its return on its global portfolio was 11.7%.13 In 2008, the 
return on capital was 6.8% and its global investments lost 2.1%. By comparison, Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund’s return on capital in 2009 was 25.6% and in 2008 was -23.3%.14 
Based on its 2009 performance, the CIC has reportedly asked for an additional $200 billion in 
capital.15 The State Council has not made a decision on the request. 
The CIC’s Investment Activities 
Because of the separation of management between the CIC and Central Huijin, the investment 
activities of each entity should be examined independently. In general, the CIC’s major 
investments have been made overseas, while Central Huijin has focused on domestic investments. 
In addition, Central Huijin’s primary objective is to support China’s financial institutions; the CIC 
is supposed to make commercially based investments. 
Investments by the CIC 
The CIC’s investment activities can be divided into three distinct periods (see Ta bl e 2 below). 
First, just prior to and immediately after its establishment, the CIC focused its investments on 
financial institutions. The second period was one of comparative investment inactivity in 
response to the global financial crisis. Third, the CIC reactivated its investment activity starting in 
2009, with a notable shift to investments in energy and natural resource companies. The apparent 
change has raised concerns about the commercial basis of CIC’s investment strategy. 
According to a report submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in February 
2010, the CIC had holdings in 82 different U.S. entities as of December 31, 2009, with a total 
worth of $9.627 billion.16 In addition to those U.S. companies listed in Tab le 2 , the CIC held 
shares in several other major corporations, including Apple, Bank of America, Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe, Chesapeake Energy, Citigroup, Coca Cola, Eli Lilly, Hartford Financial 
Services, Ingersoll-Rand, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Metlife, Motorola, News Corp, Pfizer, 
Sprint Nextel, Terex, and Wells Fargo. 
There have also been a number of unsubstantiated reports of the CIC interest in investing in other 
companies. In the spring and summer of 2009, there were repeated claims that the CIC was 
considering providing Australian mining giant Fortescue a loan of $1 billion.17 The CIC was also 
reputedly pondering an investment in the French nuclear power company Areva during the 
summer of 2009.18 In October 2009, there were claims that CIC was among a list of possible 
13
 CIC’s registered capital is $200 billion, the initial amount provided at its creation. As of December 31, 2009, CIC’s 
global portfolio was worth $81.1 billion. 
14
 As reported in its 2009 annual report, available online at http://www.nbim.no/en/press-and-publications/Reports/ 
2009/annual-report-2009/ 
15
 “CIC Planning More Resource Investments,” China Daily, January 28, 2010. 
16
 Security and Exchange Commission Form 13F, submitted on February 5, 2010, SEC File Number 028-13664. A 
complete list of CIC’s holdings of U.S. companies is provided in an Appendix to this report. 
17
 “CIC, Fortescue Metals in Talks for $1b Bond Issue,” China Daily, August 12, 2009. 
18
 “CIC May Buy into France’s Areva: Report,” China Knowledge, September 4, 2009. 
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investors in Russian aluminum producer United Co Rusal.19 During a January 2010 forum in 
Hong Kong, CIC Chairman Lou indicated that the CIC had been discussing possible investments 
in the mining industries of Brazil and Mexico.20 More recently, the CIC was reportedly 
negotiating with Harvard University to purchase some of its real estate funds, but the talks 
apparently were unsuccessful.21 
Table 2. Major Investments by the CIC 
(in chronological order) 
Company (Country) 
Blackstone Group (USA) 
Morgan Stanley (USA) 
Visa (USA) 
Reserve Primary Fund (USA) 
Morgan Stanley (USA) 
CITIC Capital (China) 
Teck Resources Limited (Canada) 
JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration 
Production (Kazakhstan) 
Goodman Group (Australia) 
Songbird Estates Limited (UK) 
Nobel Oil Group (Russia) 
PT Bumi Resources (Indonesia) 
Noble Group Limited (Singapore) 
Iron Mining International (Hong 
Kong) 
AES Corporation (USA) 
Type of 
Industry or 
Sector 
Financial 
Services 
Financial 
Services 
Financial 
Services 
Investment 
Fund 
Financial 
Services 
Financial 
Services 
Energy 
Energy 
Property 
Development 
Property 
Development 
Energy 
Energy/Natural 
Resources 
Natural 
Resources 
Natural 
Resources 
Energy 
Date of 
Initial 
Investment 
May 2007a 
December 
2007 
March 2008b 
September 
2008 
June 2009 
July 2009 
July 2009 
July 2009 
August 2009 
September 
2009 
September 
2009 
September 
2009 
September 
2009 
October 
2009 
November 
2009 
Type of 
Investment 
Shares 
Shares 
Shares 
Fund 
Shares 
Shares 
Shares 
Global 
depository 
receipts 
Loan 
Shares 
Equity 
acquisition 
Loan 
Shares 
Loan 
Shares 
Value of 
Investment 
$3.0 billion 
$5.6 billion 
$100 million 
$5.4 billion 
$2.2 billion 
$250 million 
$1.5 billion 
$940 million 
$159 million 
$158 million 
$270 million 
$1.9 billion 
$858 million 
$500 million 
$1.6 billion 
Percentage 
of 
Ownership 
9.4% 
9.9% 
0.5% 
Not 
applicable 
9.9%c 
40.0% 
17.5% 
10.6% 
Not 
applicable 
14.7% 
45.0% 
Not 
applicable 
14.9% 
Not 
applicable 
15.0% 
19
 “Rusal Wants CIC, Temasek as IPO Investors,” China Daily, October 28, 2009. 
20
 “CIC Planning More Resources Investments,” China Daily, January 28, 2010. 
21 Lingling Wei and Dinny McMahon, “CIC Seeks Harvard’s U.S. Real-Estate Portfolio ,” Wall Street Journal, August 
4, 2010; Zoe Hughes, “Harvard, CIC Reportedly End Real Estate Fund Sale Talks,” PERE News, September 10, 2010. 
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Company (Country) 
SouthGobi Energy Resources 
Limited (Canada) 
GCL-Poly Energy Holdings 
Limited (Hong Kong) 
BlackRock Inc. 
Apax Partners (UK) 
Changsha Zoomlion Heavy 
Industry Science & Technology 
Development (China) 
Penn West Energy Trust (Canada) 
Type of 
Industry or 
Sector 
Energy 
Energy 
Investment 
Fund 
Investment 
Fund 
Manufacturing 
Energy 
Date of 
Initial 
Investment 
November 
2009 
November 
2009 
Unknown 
February 
2010 
March 2010 
May 2010 
Type of 
Investment 
Convertible 
debenture 
Shares 
Shares 
Equity 
acquisition 
Shares 
Equity 
acquisition 
Value of 
Investment 
$500 million 
$717 million 
$714 million 
$956 million 
$816 million 
$801 million 
Percentage 
of 
Ownership 
Not 
applicable 
20.1% 
unknown 
2.3% 
15.8% 
45.0%d 
Source: The CIC annual reports, SEC filings, and various news accounts. 
Notes: Precise dates for some transactions are not possible due to the CIC’s reluctance to reveal specifics of its 
investments. 
a. Investment made prior to the establishment of the CIC; title to shares transferred to the CIC In November 
2007; in October 2008, the CIC negotiated an option to purchase up to 12.5% of Blackstone, which it has 
not yet fully utilized. 
b. As of December 31, 2009, the CIC owned 4.05 million shares of Visa, worth $354 million. 
c. The CIC’s prior holdings of Morgan Stanley were diluted to 7.7% in October 2008 by an investment by 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. The CIC’s June 2009 investment returned its holdings to 9.9% of 
Morgan Stanley. In July and August 2010, the CIC sold some of its holding in Morgan Stanley to keep its 
percentage of ownership below 10.0%. 
d. A SEC filing of June 1, 2010 reported the CIC’s purchase of 5.3% of Penn West Energy Trust’s outstanding 
trust units. 
The shift in the CIC’s portfolio is also discernible by comparing its reported global portfolio 
holdings as of the end of 2008 and 2009 (see Tab le 3 below). Between the end of 2008 and the 
end of 2009, the CIC shifted most of its holdings from cash funds into equities and fixed income 
securities. According to the CIC, this shift was facilitated by several factors. First, the CIC 
acquired the personnel and capabilities to more efficiently allocate its investments. Second, as 
global markets began to recover from the financial crisis, new investment opportunities emerged. 
Third, the perceived “protectionist” attitudes of Europe and the United States to sovereign wealth 
fund investments diminished, making it easier for the CIC to act on the emerging opportunities.22 
“CIC’s Head Thanks Western Protectionism for Preventing Investment Losses,” China Stakes, April 20, 2009. 
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Table 3. the CIC’s Global Portfolio Holdings by Type of Investment 
As of end of calendar year 
Type of Investment 
Equities 
Fixed Income Securities 
Cash Funds 
Other Types of Investments 
2008 
3.2% 
9.0% 
87.4% 
0.4% 
2009 
36% 
26% 
32% 
6% 
Source: China Investment Corporation, Annual Report 2008 and Annual Report 2009, Beijing, China. 
Investments by Central Huijin 
Although Central Huijin is a wholly owned subsidiary of the CIC, according to its website, “the 
investment business of [the] CIC and the share management function conducted on behalf of the 
State Council by Central Huijin are completely separated.”23 The CIC’s website reinforces the 
claimed administrative separation between the CIC and Central Huijin: 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (Central Huijin) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of [the] CIC 
with its own Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors. It was established to invest in key 
state-owned financial institutions in China; it does not conduct any other commercial 
activities and generally is not involved in day-to-day issues within the institutions in which it 
invests. However, in early 2009, the Central Huijin [sic] took on the task of restructuring 
ailing financial institutions at the request government regulatory agencies.24 
Central Huijin’s existing portfolio as of December 31, 2009, consisted of banks, security 
companies, and other financial institutions (see Table 4 ). Since the start of the year, Central 
Huijin has reportedly acquired holdings in other Chinese financial institutions and is making 
preparations for more investments. Central Huijin reportedly received title to 43.5% of China 
Investment Capital Corporation in August 2010.25 On August 25, 2010, it sold 54 billion yuan 
($7.9 billion) worth of bonds, reportedly to finance investments in the Export-Import Bank of 
China and China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure).26 On September 18, 2010, 
Central Huijin sold an additional 55 billion yuan ($8.1 billion) in bonds.27 Central Huijin 
supposedly has received approval to issue up to 187.5 billion yuan ($27.6 billion) in bonds to 
invest in several state-owned banks, including BOC, CCB, and ICBC.28 These investments are to 
prevent the dilution of Central Huijin’s holdings in the banks after they issue new shares in the 
future and provide the banks with additional capital. 
23
 http://www.huijin-inv.cn/hjen/aboutus/aboutus_2008.html?var1=About 
24
 http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/about_cic/aboutcic_overview.html 
25
 Greg Bright, “CIC Expands Portfolio with Major Investment Bank Stake,” Top 1000 Funds, August 25, 2010. 
Morgan Stanley is currently a major shareholder of CICC, but is attempting to sell its holdings, reportedly to Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co. and TPG Capital. 
26
 “Huijin to Inject 88b Yuan in Exim Bank, Sinosure,” China Daily, August 10, 2010; Zhang Yuzhe, “Central Huijin 
Raises 54 Billion Yuan in Bond Sale,” Caixin, August 26, 2010. 
27
 “Central Huijin Raises RMB55 Bln via Two-batch Bonds Sale,” China Daily, September 19, 2010. 
28
 “Huijin to Sell $27.6b of Bonds in First Ever Debt Sale,” China Daily, August 19, 2010; “Huijin Nodded for 54b 
Yuan Sale of Bonds,” China Daily, August 17, 2010. 
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Table 4. Central Huijin’s Investments 
(as of December 31, 2009) 
Company Name 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
Bank of China (BOC) 
China Construction Bank (CCB) 
China Development Bank (CDB) 
China Everbright Bank 
China Galaxy Financial Holdings 
China Jianyin Investment 
China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation 
Guotai Junan Securities 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
New Life Insurance Co.., Ltd. 
Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co., Ltd. 
Date of Investment 
10/29/2008 
12/30/2003 
12/30/2003 
12/31/2007 
11/30/2007 
7/14/2005 
9/9/2004 
4/11/2007 
10/14/2005 
4/22/2005 
1 1/19/2009 
9/21/2005 
Percentage Ownership 
50.00% 
67.53% 
57.10% 
48.70% 
70.88% 
78.57% 
100.00% 
85.50% 
21.28% 
35.41% 
38.82% 
37.23% 
Source: The Central Huijin’s website – http://www.huijin-inv.cn/. 
Note: In July 2009, 20.7 billion shares of CCB were transferred from China Jianyin Investment to Central Huijin, 
raising its holdings to 133.3 billion shares, or 57.10%. 
China’s Debate over the Role of the CIC 
Starting in the summer of 2008, the CIC’s poor overseas investment performance, plus internal 
and external administrative tensions, gave rise to discussions about reforming the CIC. Internally, 
there were problems reconciling the CIC’s overall investment mission with Central Huijin’s 
domestic investment focus. Externally, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), 
which reports directly to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), made an apparent bid in 2008 to 
challenge the CIC’s role as the Chinese government’s leading overseas investment fund.29 
Stories about possible competition between the CIC and SAFE also surfaced early in 2008. In 
April 2008, Caijing Magazine reported that the State Council had authorized SAFE to invest up 
to 5% of China’s foreign exchange reserves—at the time, the equivalent of nearly $90 billion—in 
non-fixed income investments.30 Financial analyst Logan Wright wrote in June 2008 that SAFE’s 
“encroaching on the CIC’s turf is likely more reflective of these bureaucratic conflicts than a 
coordinated government strategy for investing China’s foreign exchange reserves.”31 
In July 2008, sources in China reported that Chinese officials were discussing the possible 
separation of the CIC and Central Huijin.32 Two of the key issues motivating the possible 
29
 For more details of SAFE’s challenge to CIC, see CRS Report RL34337, China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, by 
Michael F. Martin. 
30 Yu Ning, “SAFE’s Reserve Investments Accelerate,” Caijing Magazine, April 28, 2008, in Chinese. 
Logan Wright, “CIC and SAFE: Coordination or Bureaucratic Conflict?,” China Stakes, June 24, 2008. 
“A Simmering CIC-Huijin Separation,” China Stakes, July 8, 2008. 
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separation were the desire to avoid potential regulatory problems and a clarification of the roles 
of Central Huijin and the CIC. The Federal Reserve licenses for CCB and ICBC branches in New 
York City were reportedly delayed in part because of the combined shareholdings of the CIC and 
Central Huijin in the two banks.33 In August 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve informed the CIC 
that it could not subsidize loans for its companies via an ICBC branch in New York City.34 If the 
two investment agencies were separated, it was expected that the CIC would remain primarily an 
investor in overseas assets, while Central Huijin would become an administrator of state-owned 
financial assets—such as the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China 
Construction Bank, the China Development Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China. 
For a time, it appeared that China’s leadership had decided not to make major changes in the 
CIC’s organization and operation. On October 22, 2008, China’s State Council announced that it 
was assigning new roles to Central Huijin and China Jianyin Investment Company, but keeping 
both firms under the CIC.35 Central Huijin was to serve as a investment institution holding 
majority stakes in China’s larger state-owned banks. As a result, China Jianyin Investment 
Company would transfer some of its holdings over to Central Huijin, so it could focus on its new 
function as an “investment platform for companies.”36 In January 2009, it was reported that 
Central Huijin had taken control of China Jianyin Investment Company’s holdings in five 
securities firms (including CIC Securities and UBS Securities), but not China Investment Capital 
Corporation (CICC).37 
Talk of splitting the CIC and Central Huijin reemerged in the summer of 2010.38 According to 
news accounts, Chinese authorities were considering divesting the CIC of all of its domestic 
holdings, including Central Huijin.39 The split was being contemplated to allow the CIC to 
diversify its portfolio and focus on its international investments. The move also may be under 
consideration to free the CIC of various restrictions on its overseas investments, particularly in 
the United States. According to sources cited in the report, it was unclear if the CIC would be 
compensated for the approximately $70 billion in domestic holdings. In addition, there was 
discussion about whether Central Huijin would report directly to the State Council or be acquired 
by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC). 
Concerns About the CIC 
The recent investment activities of the CIC and its subsidiary, Central Huijin, have raised 
concerns among some financial analysts.40 These concerns can be generally divided into two main 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Scott Lanman, “Fed Sets Limits on ICBC Loans to China Fund-Owned Companies,” Bloomberg, September 4, 2008. 
35
 Li Qing, “Reshuffling Begins for State Finance Arms,” Caijing Magazine, November 4, 2008. 
36 
37 
Ibid. 
Li Qing, “New Roadmap for Central Huijin’s Brokers,” Caijing Magazine, January 6, 2009. 
38
 For example, China Daily published an article, “CIC Restructuring Plan Under Discussion,” on September 10, 2010, 
discussing alternative proposals for CIC’s reorganization. 
39
 Li Xiang and Mao Lijun, “Sovereign Fund Spin-off ‘Considered’,” China Daily, July 7, 2010. 
40
 For example, see Gordon L. Clark and Ashby H. B. Monk, “Nation-state Legitimacy, Trade, and the China 
Investment Corporation,” March 31, 2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582647. The authors are co-directors 
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issues. The first issue is whether the CIC’s investments are being made on commercial merit, or 
are being made for strategic reasons as part of a larger government policy. The second issue is the 
CIC’s commitment to “passive” investment. 
The shift in the CIC’s direct investments that began in the summer of 2009 from financial entities 
to energy and natural resources companies caught the attention of investors and analysts alike. 
Some speculated that the shift indicated a change in the CIC’s investment strategy and could be 
part of a larger Chinese government effort to secure access to natural resources for China’s 
rapidly expanding economy. This speculation was partially fueled by statements from the CIC’s 
officials, who indicated that these investments were hedges against inflation, implying that the 
investments were made for macroeconomic reasons. 
The investment activities of Central Huijin also have been questioned. Although Central Huijin 
has not made direct investments in non-financial entities, it has been speculated that by providing 
additional capital to major Chinese banks, Central Huijin is indirectly financing state-owned 
enterprises and large private companies and their overseas acquisitions and investments. For 
example, Central Huijin is a major shareholder of CDB, which reportedly provided financing for 
Chinalco’s bid to take over the Australian mining company, Rio Tinto. 
The other main issue is the CIC’s possible shift from being a passive to an active investor. 
According to a CIC representative, the sovereign wealth fund voluntarily refused seats on the 
boards of directors of Blackstone and Morgan Stanley in 2007.41 However, the CIC has retained 
the option to appoint someone to the boards for some of its more recent investments, such as 
AES, GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited, and SouthGobi Energy Resources Limited. There are 
also reports that the CIC promised the SEC that it would not seek more than one seat on Morgan 
Stanley’s board in order to obtain SEC approval for its purchase of more than 10% of the 
investment company.42 
Congressional Considerations 
There have been no direct policy statements from the Obama administration on sovereign wealth 
funds in general or the CIC in particular. However, as a presidential candidate, President Obama 
stated, “I am concerned if these … sovereign wealth funds are motivated by more than just 
market considerations, and that’s obviously a possibility.”43 The subject of sovereign wealth funds 
arose during a November 2009 hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs. During her confirmation hearing, Marisa Lago, nominee for Assistant Secretary for 
International Markets and Development for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, responded to a 
question about sovereign investments by saying, “Sovereign wealth funds are not just a private 
sector investor, but rather are arms of government.”44 
(...continued) 
of the Oxford SWF Project at Oxford University. 
41
 CRS interview with CIC representative, March 2010. 
42
 “CIC to Expand Morgan Stanley Stake,” Zacks Equity Research, September 1, 2010. 
43
 “Obama Says Concerned about Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Reuters, February 7, 2008. 
44
 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Nomination Hearing, 111th Cong., 1 
sess., November 5, 2009. 
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The CIC’s investments in the United States are currently subject to two main forms of regulatory 
review, one by CFIUS and the other by the SEC. In addition, inward FDI in specific industries or 
markets – including investments by the CIC – may be subject to laws and regulations governing 
those particular industries and/or markets.45 
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-49) broadened the 
investigatory authority of CFIUS in cases of national security risk, and increased the committee’s 
reporting requirements to Congress. However, some analysts have suggested that the recent 
changes do not adequately protect the United States from economic risks posed by SWFs and/or 
inward FDI from China. These potential economic risks are seen as including financial market 
instability, undesirable foreign control or influence over key industries or companies, access to 
sensitive technology, and other forms of unfair competitive advantages. Among the regulatory 
changes that have been suggested are: 
• Requirements that any SWF interested in investing in the United States publicly 
release audited financial statements that follow international accounting 
standards on a regular basis; 
• Restrictions on the percentage of a U.S. company that an SWF may own (other 
governments have such limits; for example, Hong Kong authorities have said 
they may withdraw the authority of Standard Chartered Bank to issue Hong Kong 
currency if the share of its stock owned by a Singaporean SWF exceeds 20%); 
• Restrictions on the type of investment SWFs may make in U.S. companies— 
alternatives include restricting SWFs to the purchase of nonvoting shares, 
banning SWFs from negotiating a seat on the company’s board of directors or 
representation in the company’s senior management; and 
• Changes in U.S. tax code—under current U.S. law, the profits of SWFs are 
generally tax-exempt; it has been suggested that the tax-exemption for SWFs be 
eliminated or restricted. 
In addition, policy analysts have suggested that access to U.S. financial markets should be 
contingent on the successful conclusion of a reciprocity agreement that would allow U.S. banks 
and financial institutions comparable access to the other nation’s investment and financial 
markets. 
However, some observers are concerned that increasing the regulatory constraints on SWFs could 
precipitate a period of global financial protectionism.46 In addition, China might respond to 
additional restrictions on Chinese investments in the United States by restricting U.S. FDI in 
China or U.S. companies’ access to China’s financial markets. The issue is whether the value of 
protection obtained outweighs the forgone benefits of investments prevented in more restrictive 
global and/or Chinese financial markets. 
45
 CRS Report RL33103, Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Statutory Restrictions, by Michael V. 
Seitzinger. 
46
 Edwin M. Truman, “Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government Investments in the United 
States: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, November 14, 2007. 
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Appendix. The CIC’s Holdings of Companies, 
Investment Funds, and Index Funds 
(as of December 31, 2009) 
Company Holdings (61) 
Abbott Labs 
American International Group 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd. 
A123 Sys Inc. 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Coca Cola Co. 
Cummins Inc. 
Fidelity National Financial 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kinross Gold Corp. 
Lincoln National Corp. 
Metlife Inc. 
Navistar International Corp. 
Noble Corp. 
Precision Castparts Corp. 
Smith International Inc. 
Teck Resources Ltd. 
Textron Inc. 
Vales S. A. 
Wells Fargo & Co. 
Aetna Inc. 
AMR Corp. 
Apple Inc. 
Bank of America Corp. 
Chesapeake Energy Corp. 
Comerica Inc. 
D R Horton Inc. 
Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold 
Hartford Financial Services Group 
Kar Auction Services Inc. 
KLA-Tencor Corp 
MEMC Electrical Materials Inc. 
Morgan Stanley 
News Corp. 
Pfizer 
Pulte Homes Inc. 
Shanda Games Ltd. 
Terex Corp. 
United Health Group Inc. 
Visa Inc 
American Eagle Outfitters 
Anadarko Pete Corp. 
Arcelormittal SA 
Blackrock Inc. 
Citigroup Inc. 
CSX Corp. 
Expeditor International Wash. Inc. 
Gold Fields Ltd. 
Ingersoll-Rand 
Keycorp 
Lilly Eli & Co. 
Merck & Co. 
Motorola Inc. 
New York Community Bancorp Inc. 
Potash Corp. 
Research in Motion Ltd. 
Sprint Nextel Corp. 
Tesoro Corp. 
Valero Energy Corp. 
Weatherford International 
Investment Funds (14) 
Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF 
Select Sector SPDR Healthcare Fund 
Select Sector SPDR International 
Industrial Fund 
SPDR Series Trust S&P Oil & Gas 
Exploration & Production 
Select Sector SPDR Consumer 
Discretionary Fund 
Select Sector SPDR International 
Energy Fund 
Select Sector SPDR Materials Fund 
SPDR Trust Series 1 
Select Sector SPDR Consumer 
Staples Fund 
Select Sector SPDR International 
Financial Fund 
SPDR Gold Trust Gold Shares Fund 
Index Funds (7) 
iShares MSCI Japan Index Fund 
iShares MSCI EAFE Index Fund 
iShares S&P Global Materials Sector 
Index Fund 
iShares FTSE/Xinhua China 25 Index 
Fund 
iShares Russell 2000 Index Fund 
iShares MSCI Emerging Markets 
Index Fund 
iShares S&P Global Energy Sector 
Index Fund 
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